HOLLYWOOD POLICE OFFICERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM Office of Retirement 4205 Hollywood Blvd., Suite 4 Hollywood, Florida 33021

April 26, 2021

MINUTES

A special meeting of the Hollywood Police Officers' Retirement System was held on Monday, April 26, 2021, at 1:00 P.M., in the Office of Retirement, 4205 Hollywood Blvd., Suite 4, Hollywood, Florida 33021.

PRESENT:

D. Strauss, Chairman, C. Marano, Board Secretary, J. Marano, C. Boyd¹, P. Laskowski, Justin Schweighardt & Mileta Djokic.

Also present were Steven Sparkman & Luis Ortiz, Retired Members; Paul A. Daragjati & Rose Daragjati, Special Counsel for the Board; Michael F Dutko, Counsel for the Plaintiffs²; Stuart Kaufman, Legal Counsel - Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson; Terri Wright, Court Reporter; David M. Williams, Plan Administrator.

PUBLIC COMMENT

None.

CORRECTIONS MATTER

The Board of Trustees held this special meeting with regard to the request for credited service in the Hollywood Police Officers' Retirement System, by the cited Plaintiffs.

Pre-Hearing Filings were received by the Board of Trustees. A motion was made by Mr. Laskowski to enter into evidence the Motion of Stipulated Facts and Member Affidavits. The motion was seconded by Mr. Djokic and passed 7-0.

The Evidentiary Hearing was conducted as follows:

- Opening argument by the Applicants.
- Opening argument by Board Advocate.
- Presentation of the Applicants' case in chief.
- Presentation of Board Advocate's case in chief.
- Rebuttal evidence from the Applicants.

The transcript of the Hearing is attached hereto.

At the conclusion of the presentations, all parties agreed to prepare written orders citing their position for the Board to consider by May 14, 2021.

MEETING ADJOURNED

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 2:06 P.M.

The next scheduled meeting is April 30th, 2021 at 10:30 A.M.

¹ Attended Remotely

 $^{^2}$ STEVEN SPARKMAN, LUIS A. ORTIZ, JOHN KIDD, ARNOLD CAMPBELL, DANIEL CASEY, DANA DOKLEAN, and MICHAEL McKINNEY

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Respectfully submitted, APPROVED:

C. Marano, Secretary D. Strauss, Chairperson

THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD POLICE OFFICERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING

IN RE:

STEVEN SPARKMAN,

LUIS A. ORTIZ, JOHN KIDD,

ARNOLD CAMPBELL, DANIEL CASEY, DANA DOKLEAN and MICHAEL MCKINNEY

TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING

DATE TAKEN:

Monday, April 26, 2021

TIME:

1:00 p.m. - 2:10 p.m.

PLACE:

4205 Hollywood Blvd., #4,

Hollywood, FL

This cause came on to be heard at the time and place aforesaid, when and where the following proceedings were reported by:

Terri Wright
United Reporting, Inc.
1218 Southeast Third Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316
(954)525-2221

United Reporting, Inc. (954) 525-2221

		Page	2
	APPEARANCES:		
2	DAVID STRAUSS, CHAIRMAN		
3	MILETA DJOKIC, TRUSTEE		
4	PAUL LASKOWSKI, CPPT - TRUSTEE		
5	CATHY MARANO, CPPT - SECRETARY		
6			
7	JEFFREY MARANO, TRUSTEE		
8	JUSTIN SCHWEIGHARDT, TRUSTEE		
9	CHRISTOPHER BOYD, CPPT - TRUSTEE (Telephonic)		
10			
11	PAUL DARAGJATI, ESQUIRE ROSE DARAGJATI, ESQUIRE		
12	DARAGJATI LAW 4745 Sutton Park Court, #503		
13	Jacksonville, FL 32224-0251 Paul@daragjatilaw.com		
14			
15	MICHAEL DUTKO, ESQUIRE KYLE ROBERTS, ESQUIRE		
16	CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP 633 S. Federal Highway - 8th Floor		
17	Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Mdutko@conradscherer.com		
18			
19	STUART A. KAUFMAN, ESQUIRE KLAUSNER, KAUFMAN, JENSEN & LEVINSON		
20	7080 NW 4 Street Plantation, FL 33317		
21			
22	STEVEN SPARKMAN Luis Ortiz		
23	Halb of C12		
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(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had.)

MR. KAUFMAN: We're here this afternoon for the hearing on the Sparkman, et al request to review the -- a police officer from a correctional officer with the City of Hollywood.

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Mr. Kaufman. I can't hear you very well.

MR. KAUFMAN: Okay. If Counsel would just like to identify themselves for the record, I'd appreciate it.

MR. DUTKO: Good afternoon. Michael Dutko from Conrad & Scherer on behalf of the applicants. With me is Kyle Roberts, an associate of mine at Conrad & Scherer.

MR. DARAGJATI: Good afternoon to the Board.
My name is Paul Daragjati, with me is Rose
Daragjati, my associate.

MR. KAUFMAN: So we have the parties' joint stipulation of facts, which makes it a little bit easier for everybody that there are really no factual disputes. And what we're left with is a reasonable law to be cited by all of you, in that there are no witnesses you're going to hear from. The parties today -- Counsel for the parties are

1 going 2 service

going to make legal argument as to why credit service as a police officer should be granted.

Alternatively, you'll hear from Mr. Daragjati arguments why they should not receive credit in terms as a police officer.

As a matter of housekeeping, Mr. Chair, I would request or I would recommend you entertain a motion to enter into evidence the joint stipulation of facts, which also has attached to it the FDLE records with regard to each claimant and personnel action forms from the City of Hollywood with regard to each claimant.

Additionally, you received today for the first time a package from Counsel for Sparkman, Ortiz, Kidd, Campbell, Casey, Miss Doklean and Mr. McKinney. You've received affidavits signed by each of them, which would also be considered evidence. So a motion would be in order to enter into evidence the joint stipulation of facts with the attachments I've just noted, and the affidavits of each of the claimants.

MR. STRAUSS: Okay. So everything in our folder except the PowerPoint and --

MR. KAUFMAN: The PowerPoint is really just argument.

1 MR. STRAUSS: Right. And the --

MR. KAUFMAN: Counsel's argument is not really considered evidence, but the affidavits certainly are. I would just ask Mr. Daragjati if he has any objection to the affidavits coming into evidence at this point in time?

MR. DARAGJATI: We have no objection to the affidavits coming in.

MR. STRAUSS: Make a motion?

(Motion was made.)

MR. STRAUSS: All that second it?

12 (Seconded.)

MR. STRAUSS: Seconded by Jeffrey.

Everyone in favor?

15 AYE.

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16 MR. STRAUSS: Chris?

MR. BOYD: Aye.

MR. KAUFMAN: So at this time, Mr. Chair, I would have you turn the floor over to Mr. Dutko to make the presentation on behalf of his clients. At the end of his presentation, if any of the trustees have any questions for him, you can certainly ask anything that you wish to. As well, I may have some questions as well.

But Mr. Dutko, the floor is yours.

MR. STRAUSS: Thank you.

MR. DUTKO: Thank you very much. First, let me just say I appreciate you giving us the time to be here today and make this presentation to you. Very generally and succinctly we're here to ask --

MR. MARANO: Can I have you speak up, please?

MR. DUTKO: Sure.

MR. MARANO: I lost my hearing listening to your father's accolades for all those years.

MR. DUTKO: We're here to ask the Board to recognize what we think is legally justified and right and that's that while serving as what the City of Hollywood calls corrections officers or detention officers, the applicants here were in fact police officers, as that term is more generally defined by the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances and by Florida State Statute.

Despite the name of the job title itself of corrections officer or detention officer, based on the applicants' individual duties, the applicants were not correctional officers as that term is defined under Florida State Statute. They are police officers, and their time served as corrections officers or detention officers in the City of Hollywood should rightfully be credited as time as

police officers for pension purposes.

We've introduced and moved into the record the affidavits as well as the stipulation. In your packets you'll also notice there's a PowerPoint presentation. That's not evidence in this case, that's my argument now, but I thought it may be helpful to follow along with exactly what the arguments are and to see the paper form.

So as I mentioned, we are asking this Board to reclassify the applicants' employment as corrections officers/detention officers to that of a police officer in order for the applicants to be enrolled in the police officers pension from the inception of their employment at the City rather than the point at which they were given the actual job title of police officer.

The Police Officers' Retirement System, there's no dispute about this, but was established under City of Hollywood Code Chapter 33. And there are specific definitions and eligibility requirements within that Chapter. When you look at those specific eligibility requirements, when you look at the specific definitions, what becomes clear is folks in the City of Hollywood serving as what the City calls for employment purposes, corrections officers or

detention officers, are police officers.

City of Hollywood's passed an ordinance defining what a police officer is for purposes of the pension system; and under that definition the applicants here clearly qualify.

Going first to the conditions of eligibility,
Chapter 33.127 of the City's Code of Ordinances. I
don't think that there's any question that the
requirements listed in that section are met by the
applicants here. Such police officer satisfactorily
completes all required medical examinations for a
police officer of his classification. The
classification here would be corrections
officer/detention officer, but it's still a police
officer. Such police officer meets all of the
requirements of the City. The methods and procedures
to be followed with regard to the above determined by
the Board.

The most important part of this consideration I think is the definitions that are spelled out both in Florida State Statute and the City's Code of Ordinances. And the definition of police officer in both is the same essentially. So we first have the definition under Florida Statutes Section 185.02, specifically Subsection 16. It says: "A police

officer means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by a municipality, who is certified or required to be certified as a law enforcement officer in compliance with 943.1395, who is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests, and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, and highway laws of the state."

Breaking that down, I think to the component parts of what makes our arguments correct, any person employed full-time by a municipality, certified or required to be certified as a law enforcement officer, vested with the authority to bear arms and make arrests, whose primary responsibility is the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state. That's what these folks did as detention officers, as corrections officers in the City of Hollywood.

You'll see -- we next have the definition of police officer under the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances for pension purposes, specifically Section 33.126. Again, parsing the words to I think what's important here: "Any person employed full-time by the City, who is certified or required to be

certified as a law enforcement officer in compliance with Florida Statute 943.1395, who is vested with the authority to bear arms, make arrests and whose primary responsibility is the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state".

The applicants here were certified as officers pursuant to 943.1395. That section provides different types of certifications that can be obtained, but I don't think there's any dispute that when serving as corrections officers or detention officers for the City of Hollywood, the applicants were certified pursuant to 943.1395.

Getting then to the definitions that I believe have been presented to you previously to make the case that my clients were correctional officers and not police officers for purposes of Florida State statutes. We'll look at that now. So under 943.10, the following words and phrases are defined. "Law enforcement officer means any person who is elected, appointed or employed full-time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof who is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime with the

enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state."

That definition is the same as you'll remember the definition of a police officer under Florida statutes that I read previously, and the definition of a police officer under the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances, which we also referenced previously.

The second definition there is what Florida statutes define as a correctional officer.

"Correctional officer means any person who is appointed or employed full-time by the state or any political subdivision thereof or by any private entity which is contracted with the state or county, and whose primary responsibility is the supervision, protection, care, custody and control or investigation of inmates within a correctional institution."

There is not and never has been a correctional institution in the City of Hollywood. A holding cell in the police department or a detention center in the police department where arrestees would go prior to being transported to Broward County main jail for booking purposes, for first appearance purposes, for all purposes, that's not a correctional facility. I've seen no definition under Florida Statutes that

would indicate that that's a correctional facility.

So just definitionally, the applicants here cannot be considered correctional officers under that definition of Florida Statutes.

Now, the next slide in the PowerPoint gets into why the applicants are not correctional officers.

The applicants' duties were that of police officers, as the term is defined by the City of Hollywood Code of Ordinances, regardless of what their technical job classification was for employment purposes from the City.

Under Florida statutory framework, "a correctional officer is someone whose primary responsibility is the supervision, protection, care, custody and control or investigation of inmates within a correctional institution".

Again, that's not what we have here. The City
Jail where applicants carried out most of their
duties was not a correctional institution in any
sense as a holding cell in the City of Hollywood
Police Department. Rather than house criminals over
night, they held arrestees for a limited time until
they were transferred to the main detention center.
The City Jail did not feed arrestees, did not clothe
arrestees, did not provide normal services that a

1 correctional institution would.

The applicants also assisted in the arresting process for suspected violations of the penal and criminal laws of the State of Florida.

All that is spelled out in the affidavits from each of my clients, which detail what their job duties and responsibilities were and which demonstrate that those duties and responsibilities were of police officers, they were not correctional officers under the Florida State Statutory definition.

What are correctional officers under Chapter 943? Well, they work in long-term correctional institutions, they don't have arrest powers, they're required to call local police to arrest if someone turned themselves in at the gates of an institution. And correctional officers and institutions are not issued a firearm, rather a firearm would be checked out for particular purposes and limited time. We know that because of the affidavit of John Kidd, who also served as a correctional officer. So he's able to detail what the duties and responsibilities were of that job and it's not the duties and responsibilities of my clients when they work for the City of Hollywood.

There were three cases that were presented to the Board at its original hearing when you considered this request. Those cases were Headley versus Sharpe, City of Miami versus Rumpf, and City of Miami versus Musial. I contend and we'll argue that to the extent those cases have any applicability here whatsoever, which I think for some of them is more dubious than others. They actually support our request and don't provide this Board a legal basis to deny the reclassification.

Looking first at Headley versus Sharpe, which was the first case chronologically. In Headley, the Third District Court of Appeal, which is the court of appeal for the area around Miami, held that there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the chancellor holding that desk sergeants, booking officers, prison guards and matrons are policemen within the intentions of Chapter 185 of Florida Statute and are entitled to the benefits under the Miami Police Relief and Pension Fund.

So holding the Court stated that the duties of the appellees, which included prison guards, were undoubtedly a police function under Chapter 185. The duties of the appellees in that instance, primarily the supervision of City Jail and supervision of the

prisoners and their activities during the terms of their confinements, there's no question that these services rendered by the appellees can be classified as a police function in that they keep the public peace; that they conserve both life and property and that their activities are vital to the public welfare of the State pursuant to Chapter 185.01.

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Definitions have changed since the time of Headley vs. Sharpe in 1962. And I believe that its applicability is questionable because of that. However, the holding in Headley vs. Sharpe is important here, which is it is the duties of the applicants which control the decision on whether they're classified as police officers or classified in some other way for pension purposes. actual duties and responsibilities that's important, not the name that someone in H.R. figured would be a good job title for a particular position; not the semantics of it, but what are the duties and responsibilities and how do those match up to the statutory definitions and code definitions that the City of Hollywood has determined are appropriate here.

Second case was City of Miami versus Rumpf. In Rumpf the question was whether personnel in the

corrections division of the police department were entitled to the same pay as police officers in the enforcement division of the department. The Third District Court of Appeal, again, the same appellate court down in Miami held that they were not entitled to the same pay because the City Charter gave the Civil Service Board authority to establish different classifications of employees, and those classifications were not challenged in this case.

The Court there distinguished the facts from the previous Headley case that we just talked about, but didn't receive from that hold - didn't receive from that case, right? So that was still good law after the City of Miami versus Rumpf. And the Court stated that a person may be a police officer within the broad definition of Chapter 185 for pension purposes, but not a police officer within the import of manual job descriptions of the City of Miami.

That's what we have here. We have two different classifications for folks who, under the general definition of police officer that was put together by the City of Hollywood and the city commissioners, different classifications of folks who are police officers. But that doesn't change the fact that even with those different classifications, my clients when

serving as detention officers or correction officers were, in fact, police officers under that general definition under the Code.

The last case that was discussed previously was the City of Miami versus Musial. In that case the Third District Court of Appeals, same Court again, noted that the significant difference and primary reason for not allowing a transfer was the difference in training that persons in the records and identification section underwent as compared to the training for police officers.

Here there is no such distinction. The corrections officers, my clients, underwent nearly identical training to police officers. Further, unlike the City of Miami, in Musial the City of Hollywood did not classify correction officers and police officers different for pension purposes.

That's an important point. You notice in the Code of Ordinances there's a definition for police officers.

There's no definition for corrections officer or detention officer because it's not a different classification, it's not a different thing. Folks who are working as corrections officers or detention officers are police officers.

Now what are my clients or what were my clients'

duties and responsibilities at the time they were serving as correction officers? Employed full-time by the City of Hollywood Police Department, certified as required by 943.1395, had the primary responsibility of enforcing the penal and criminal laws of the State under command of the police patrol sergeant, were issued firearms, duty belts, body armor from the Police Department, had the authority to arrest, complete probable cause affidavits on warrants and issue notices to appear, both inside and outside the City Jail.

They were entrusted with the care, custody and control of arrestees during the process where those arrestees were going from the scene of a crime to eventually Broward County main booking facility.

They had the power to apprehend escaped arrestees, they completed in-service trainings with police officers, drove marked patrol vehicles or marked police vehicles, I should say, directly participated in operations as an officer with other police officers in arresting and transporting arrestees.

And the City of Hollywood Jail, the City Jail within the Hollywood Police Department, did not house arrestees overnight, nor did it feed, it was not a correctional institution, as that word can in any

1 common sense way be understood.

Accordingly, we ask that this Court recognize what we think is fair and equitable to my clients, which is the time that they served with the City of Hollywood under the given title of corrections officers or detention officers should be re-classified from the General Employee Retirement System to the City of Hollywood Police Pension System and credited as such.

They are police officers. They were police officers at the time. And it would be unjust for this Board to consider them anything other than that.

That's the end of my presentation. I'm happy to answer any questions that you may have that may be helpful. Otherwise, I thank you for your time.

MR. KAUFMAN: Did the trustees have any questions for Mr. Dutko?

MR. MARANO: You said something about probable cause affidavits, so if they were in the facility and they found either contraband or a weapon, they would do an ADD charge on a probable cause affidavit and sign the affidavit?

MR. DUTKO: Sure. So, I'm hesitant to answer that question myself. And I believe one of my clients may be most suited to answer just because

they answer that question is not necessarily in evidence at this point. So we're happy to offer the testimony that would be necessary to answer that.

MR. KAUFMAN: I wouldn't have a problem with that if Mr. Daragjati has no objections for the limited purposes of answering the questions, selecting one of your class members to testify on behalf of the (inaudible) --

MR. DARAGJATI: I have no objection. That's fine.

MR. DUTKO: Mr. Sparkman, would you like to answer that question?

(Whereupon, Steven Sparkman was sworn in by the Court Reporter.)

MS. MARANO: Please state your name for the record.

OFFICER SPARKMAN: Steven Sparkman, S-P-A-R-K-M-A-N.

In answer to your question, Jeff, in a circumstance like that I had done that, where I have add charged, especially if they had already left the detention center. The most common experience I had in doing probable cause affidavits are when somebody would come to the fishbowl, information desk would call up and say somebody was turning themselves in on

whatever type of warrant it was. Instead of having a road patrol officer come in, I would go downstairs, bring them to detention, verify the warrant and then I would do the probable cause affidavit.

MR. MARANO: Okay. And is battery on -- if they perpetrate a battery on you -- I guess keep going? If they perpetrated a battery on you, would they be charged under the same statute?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: Yes, battery on a law enforcement officer.

MR. MARANO: Do you remember a point in time that correction officers were in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Broward County PBA and the City of Hollywood?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: I know that happened. That happened after I had already been promoted according to --

MR. MARANO: Do you have that at all, Mr. Dutko?

MR. DUTKO: I don't believe so.

MR. KAUFMAN: We can get that information prior to reaching a decision.

MR. MARANO: And at any time were any of the detention officers ever party to a 1983 civil case as if, you know, as if officers were at the same time?

Was there a point in time where I believe

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somebody in your unit was subject to a 1983?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: I believe so. It wasn't me, but I do remember. I can't recall who it was. I don't believe they're here anymore.

MR. MARANO: That's all.

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MR. KAUFMAN: Very good. While OFFICER

SPARKMAN is under oath, I don't know if any of the other trustees have any questions for him.

MR. LASKOWSKI: I just have a question in general. The corrections academy compared to the police academy is how many weeks?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: I can tell you what the hours are, I have certificates for hours

The corrections academy is 496 hours.

MR. DUTKO: I think the answer to that question is --

MR. STRAUSS: 796.

OFFICER SPARKMAN: 796.

MR. DUTKO: The answer to those questions too, is contained in the global profile sheets that are included as attachments to the joint stipulation.

MR. LASKOWSKI: If you're certified as a police officer, I assume you can come here where you can take a cross class, you actually had to attend the full academy. The corrections academy you didn't get

1 credit for it in the academy.

OFFICER SPARKMAN: That was not for everybody in corrections. At the time I was hired, that was Chief Witts' rule. So I know that myself, Mike McKinney, Luis Ortiz, or others all had to go back.

MR. LASKOWSKI: But there was potentially -OFFICER SPARKMAN: Other people that came after
us, I believe Dana Doklean and John Kidd and some
other people, they went to the cross certification
academy because the chief changed.

MR. LASKOWSKI: That's all only questions.

MR. DUTKO: If I could give a little more insight in answer to that question. Both the corrections academy and the police academy are certifications for purposes of the relevant Florida Statute. They're both included within that in terms of eligibility to be a law enforcement officer. So I don't think any distinctions should really make a difference in terms of what this Board's ultimate decision is.

MR. STRAUSS: Steve, a few questions, so just for everyone, Dave sent the minutes out but when Steve came in April of 2019, he stated his case. Everyone I would say was in agreement because of what you said. And then two months later when

Mr. Klausner came back with these three cases, he didn't leave us an opening and that's basically why we're here today.

So are you looking at being in our fund totally and getting out of that fund - or like Cindy Camella and other people, did you want to get your 22 and 80 here and then continue? Because what happens if the City doesn't want to transfer their money or they don't agree because they're a different pension board, and they keep paying you and now you six are getting more than every other police officer because you're getting your two and a half or your one year there and your full 22 here.

OFFICER SPARKMAN: From the consensus of everybody that's part of our suit, we want our money out of the civilian and in the police pension. When I had my meeting with one of the pension administrators at the City, she basically told me they didn't want our money, they wanted us to be in the police pensions. I mean, while I was sitting with her.

But yes, our group would like to be strictly in the police and just have to deal with the police pension.

MR. STRAUSS: Right. And we never got to that

1 point.

MR. DARAGJATI: Can you make that representation on behalf of all six of the applicants that he just made, because I'm not sure if legally he can make that representation for all of them.

MR. DUTKO: I can't, but we'd be happy to get the answer to that question and supplement the record here so that you do have the answer on behalf of all six.

MR. STRAUSS: By May? We can probably have it in about 15.

MR. DUTKO: So the Board is aware, I think there was talk about this, but the intention is that there will be no final decision today, that the parties prepare written submissions, written closing submissions that will be submitted to you that will contain arguments, and we're happy to supplement the record through that process so you'll have the documentation well in advance of any decision that you make.

MR. STRAUSS: Right. Because we never -- in the June meeting we never got to the point of discussing any of those things because of the way our lawyers, you know, came back with these three cases. So if it's proved today to be the other way, in my

opinion in May, you know, it should be if the City doesn't want to transfer the money, then if it continually comes to you, that part of this suit will be that you would be transferring it into the pension, you know, to make it all even.

But that might be out of our hands even after we make this decision. And it's happened with other people that had GE and police time for different reasons other than this.

OFFICER SPARKMAN: I understand we can kind just of cross one bridge when we get there.

MR. KAUFMAN: So the trustees know, I have discussed with Counsel just prior to the hearing that in lieu of making the final decision today, that they would submit proposed orders for you to consider both of them and then we would make a final decision at the May meeting in that, you know, I had asked the parties in the pre-hearing order to submit their case law that they relied on and any statutes and you were just hit with the affidavits today as well.

I would like you to have the opportunity to fully review them prior to making a final decision. So I would ask for, yes, post hearing submissions in the form of a post order, which includes findings of facts, and conclusions of law. And at the next

meeting we would adopt one of those proposed orders.

MR. STRAUSS: At the May meeting?

MR. KAUFMAN: Yes.

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MR. STRAUSS: Not the next one.

MR. KAUFMAN: Correct

MR. STRAUSS: Thanks. Just some questions I had, wondering about the statute of limitations and what your position is as to whether or not the statute of limitations applies in that the request for A classification wasn't made until 14 years after they became police officers in the plan. When I took a look at it, I looked at the statute of limitations for a five year period of breach of contract. There's case law out there in Florida that says that a pension benefit is considered a contract. know, I would find -- or I would think that the five year statute of limitations applies. But I would ask Mr. Dutko what his position is with regard to that.

MR. DUTKO: Statute of limitations applies to a court case. That's not what we're in right now. We are before the City of Hollywood Police Pension Board and it's well within your authority to grant our request. There was some talk in the case of -- is it the Musial case? In the case of Miami versus Musial, which we discussed before, of an issue, it's a

technical legal issue, but it's called the Doctrine of Laches.

Essentially in that case the Court found that
the petitioner had waited too long to bring his
request for reclassification and therefore, a
doctrine, a legal doctrine called Laches applied,
which is essentially, there was undo delay and
because of that, in equity, the petitioner should not
be allowed to get the relief they're seeking.

First off, I'd say the Doctrine of Laches does not apply for a quasi judicial board, it doesn't apply to the Police Pension Board that is sitting here today. And on top of that, the Doctrine of Laches is an equitable defense. That means it's a defense in fairness; it would be unfair to do something otherwise.

I think that when all the facts are considered here, you really come to the other conclusion which is, it would be unfair to try to use a legal technicality that doesn't apply to this Board and doesn't bar our ability to bring this request for reclassification. It would be inherently unfair to use that inapplicable legal doctrine to deny this request.

That's why I said, you know, these cases to the

extent they apply at all, which I think because of that issue is a reason that the Musial case is not controlling authority on this Board. But to the extent that they apply at all, they really support our conclusion here, our request, which is my clients were police officers. The City had classifications within what it generally describes as police officers and correction officer, detention officer is one of them. We're not making any challenge to that classification. The issue is the folks under that classification are still police officers.

And then finally, there is no bar to our bringing this request because the equitable doctrines that we talked about, one, don't apply; and two, shouldn't apply because it would be unfair. It would not be equitable to deny our request on those grounds.

MR. MARANO: I have one more, because I do believe they were in the collective bargaining agreement at some point in time, and historically speaking, the general police union was very apprehensive about releasing any kind of members from their unit to go anywhere else. So I'm wondering if there was an order by PERC or a decision by PERC that allowed them to leave and come under the

representation of the Broward PBA. I don't know if that PERC ever issued an order, but there may be, somebody can verify it.

MR. DUTKO: Sure. And I don't know the answer to that question. What I'd say is, as your Counsel has informed you, you're under no obligation to make a decision today. In fact, it's the intention that you don't.

But should there be additional information that would be helpful to you in considering this request, there's nothing that prevents us - if you allow us, there's nothing that prevents us from supplementing the record or presenting additional testimony or additional information to you at a later time that could answer those questions. So I'm happy to get the information for you and follow up on that. And we can submit it to the Board for your consideration.

MR. MARANO: Thank you

MR. SCHWEIGHARDT: Were they ever allowed to work as a patrol officer in that capacity at any point during the time of their employment as a corrections officer?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: No.

MR. SCHWEIGHARDT: And then directly participating operations as an officer with other

police officers and arresting and transporting arrestees, what was that?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: That was when we used to have the four street crime squads and we would be assigned to street crimes. And we'd go out, and if they were doing stings, operations, whatever, we would go out with street crimes and either be in marked police vehicles or in a van, if we had one that worked, and we would do the take-downs and things along those lines for street crimes.

MR. STRAUSS: Any other questions?

MR. KAUFMAN: Tacking onto that, I read that a -- if a police officer could work as a corrections officer, but a corrections officer could not work as a police officer; is that correct?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: We were never asked to go out and be police officers. If we were not -- if we were shorthanded, oftentimes a police officer would come and be assigned to the jail.

MR. STRAUSS: By policy?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: Correct.

MR. KAUFMAN: It was a different pay level also. When you became a police officer, you received an increase in salary.

OFFICER SPARKMAN: Yes, it was two different pay

1 levels for me.

MR. KAUFMAN: And lastly, so we're clear, there are two separate certifications, you were never certified as a police officer for the period of time that you --

OFFICER SPARKMAN: No, I was a certified corrections officer when I worked in the detention center.

MR. KAUFMAN: We can turn to the floor over to you, Mr. Daragjati. Do you have any questions?

MR. DARAGJATI: Since this individual gave testimony, do I get cross-examination?

MR. KAUFMAN: Sure.

MR. DARAGJATI: Mr. Sparkman, or Officer

Sparkman, I apologize. You testified earlier that
you served warrants at the jail. To be clear, these
were warrants and capiases equally; correct?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: Yes.

MR. DARAGJATI: And those are basically probable cause affidavit or probable cause has been found and established by an independent magistrate; correct?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: That's correct.

MR. DARAGJATI: And to be clear, you've never been assigned as a solo or you were never assigned as a solo police officer to go out and enforce traffic

or any type of law of the State of Florida during your time as a correctional officer; correct?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: Traffic law, no, I did not do traffic.

MR. DARAGJATI: And whenever you made what you would -- what you were calling in your affidavit, an arrest, it was always in support of a police operation; correct?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: No, not always. Sometimes if it was a battery on one of our correction officers, we would do a probable cause. If we found contraband after that person left, we would do a probable cause, it would go up on our own, that would go up to the County. So those were not already designated.

MR. DARAGJATI: I don't dispute that. I guess my -- maybe I didn't articulate my question correctly. Were you ever assigned to a solo patrol unit or to any type of unit where you would go out on your own, make felony arrests or even misdemeanor arrests, did you ever answer a domestic violence call, were you ever designated to write a (inaudible) for lack of a better term while you were a correctional officer?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: No, I was never assigned a zone. I did respond to calls when we would be out

assisting the street crimes unit if an officer got on the radio and requested a backup. And if I was in the area, I would back that officer up. I did it several times at Memorial Hospital when we would be transporting a, you know, we have off duty details, there was an officer assigned at Memorial that was involved in an issue and I responded as his backup officer.

MR. DARAGJATI: And you would -- that officer would make an arrest and you would transport that individual back to the station?

OFFICER SPARKMAN: In that instance, the subject was already under arrest, he was being medically cleared, and I guess started assaulting staff and the officer and that's when I responded.

MR. DARAGJATI: I have no other questions.

MR. KAUFMAN: Anybody else have any questions? If not, we can turn the floor over to Mr. Daragjati to make his presentation.

MR. DARAGJATI: To the Chair, I want to first thank everyone for giving me this opportunity to speak with you. Let me start by saying I represent police officers and correctional officers throughout the State of Florida. And I'll be the first to tell you if someone is owed something for doing this job,

they should get it, without a doubt.

However, in the same way that each of you is constricted by criminal laws and how you can conduct yourself as police officers, we are constricted by laws of the State of Florida and how you grant benefits. The state of the law in Florida is that if there is a question as to whether or not to grant a benefit to an individual, you err on the side of granting the benefit. That's the state of the law.

However, this is a big however, in this case what the applicants are doing is coming to you and asking you to construe your local ordinance and Chapter 185 in granting the benefit. They're asking you to make a construction to interpret that statute in your ordinance. I don't think there's any dispute that one must be a police officer to be part of this plan. It's required under Florida Statute 185.02.

The definition of a police officer is essentially the same in your local plan ordinance and the state statute. The definition over the years has changed quite a bit. I left a document on your desks, and what this is is the actual amendment in 1986 to the definition of police officer. At the time, before 1986, the definition of police officer was pretty fluid. It basically was a full-time

police officer will receive compensation from municipal funds of any incorporated municipality in the State of Florida for services rendered. That was it.

So, it makes sense that the Court in Headley listened to what the description of what a correctional officer at the time essentially was doing and made a judgment call as to whether or not they were in support of police officers.

However, in 1986, the Florida legislature made a judgment call and they changed the definition of police officer, and they made it into basically what it is today. "A person who is elected, appointed or employed full-time by any municipality who is certified or required to be certified as a law enforcement officer in compliance with the Florida Statute 943.14". That specific subsection was changed in '92 to reflect the change in just basically placement of definitions within 943, but it's essentially the same.

So what does that mean for your purposes? In construing a statute, the courts have been clear that when construing a state statute or municipal ordinance, the rules of construction are the same.

And the primary rule of construction in construing a

statute and interpreting a statute is when the language of the statute and clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.

And that came straight out of the case by the name of Salinas vs. Ramsey by the Florida Supreme Court. And just for the record, that site is 234 So.3d 569. And basically what that means is that if the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no more need to do any interpretation. This statute - the statute that this plan works under says you have to be certified as a law enforcement officer under 943.

There is no dispute that at the time that these individuals were working as correctional officers for the City of Hollywood, they were not certified as law enforcement officers.

There are two separate certifications; one for correctional officers, one for law enforcement officers. The people in the State of Florida through the legislature have made a judgement call that they are going to exercise two different levels of certification and qualification to do these jobs.

As you heard before, there's not as much training that is required to become a certified

correctional officer. All of the high liability stuff is the same. All of the -- some of the legal stuff is the same. However, there is a lot more training that's involved in being a police officer and all of you know this because you do the job, than being a correctional officer, and that's really important.

And circling back to the cases we talked about earlier, all of these cases were argued and decided prior to 1986. In Headley, the Third District Court of Appeals made a decision, and they basically decided that there - and I'm quoting from the case - "There is no question that these services -- and what they're talking about is the services that were provided as correctional officers taking care of the local jail in Miami. "These services rendered by the appellees can be classified as a police function in that they keep the public peace, they conserve both life and property and that their activities are vital to the public welfare of this State".

Again, that language that the Court made, that decision under the old iteration of the Statute prior to the legislature changing the Statute in 1986.

The Third District Court of Appeal made a judgment call based upon what they saw as the

function of a correctional officer at the time. Later, the same Court, as Mr. Dutko explained, had reason to revisit that case. And the second case basically what the correctional officers were doing is they were asking the Court to interpret the civil service rules of the City of Miami and make a determination that they should get the same pay as police officers. And basically the Court said, you can't rely on that Headley decision because this is strictly about civil service rules and whether or not the City has the authority under Florida law to create civil service rules and make distinctions and create classifications; and they said yes, they can do it, and reversed the lower court opinion, actually providing a higher rate of pay for these correctional officers.

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And then Musial, basically the same thing except in this case it was folks that work in the ID division were trying to get into the police pension plan. The Court said under the rules of the civil service system of the City of Miami at the time, they had the authority to make that judgment call and they can say no.

I think what's really important with these three cases is that as you see the progression from the

first case in 1962, the Court made a decision based upon this ambiguous definition of police officer in the Statute. Whereas by 1974, they were burrowing down on what the definition of a police officer is because the City of Miami Civil Service System actually provided a pretty distinctive definition.

In the same vein, in 1986 the Florida legislature changed the definition of a police officer. They basically said you have to be certified by CJCC to be considered a police officer in the State of Florida.

I don't doubt that these officers, the applicants, they engage in some of the functions of a police officer in a support role. If you look at the affidavits and the testimony you heard, they provide a valuable service to the police department at the time and to the City of Hollywood. However, they weren't out patrolling on their own, they weren't assigned a zone, they didn't go through the extra almost 300 hours of training required just at the academy to engage in that function. There's no testimony by -- they didn't go through FDO training prior to bing assigned to assist in these operations that they did.

There is a difference between correctional

officer and police officer. There is a difference, and it's recognized under statute. It's recognized under the CJSTC rules and regulations. And it's recognized in Chapter 185.02.

If the legislature wanted to allow correctional officers to be part of a police pension plan, they would have said that in the legislation. They would have included that provision of 943 in there to say they can be part of it. It's a judgment call by the legislature. And because it's so clear-cut, this body would be engaging in error if they decided to look at what they did -- what specific job functions they had at the time and basically substitute that and substitute your discretion for what's clearly in the Statute.

The Statute doesn't give really any room to breathe here. It designates whether or not you are certified as a law enforcement officer.

If you look at the factual stipulations, it's clear they were not certified as law enforcement officers. Again, I commend them for their services to the citizens of Hollywood.

However, unfortunately, we all have to work within these structures, we all have to work within the confines of the law. We don't have the

discretion here to say even though they may not have been certified as law enforcement officers, they kind of did the job some of the time, so let's let them in. You would be violating the provisions of 185.02 in my opinion if this Board did make that decision.

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One thing I do want to address that Mr. Dutko brought up was the issue of definition of correctional officer. Correctional officer is charged with the care, custody and control of inmates in a correctional institution. He's right. 943 doesn't define what a correctional institution When I draft my proposed order, I'll respond to is. it, but there are cases under the criminal law that deal with battery on a law enforcement officer. those cases they do define what a correctional institution is, and it's a pretty broad definition. Basically anywhere where an inmate is temporarily housed and assaults someone inside there, they can be charged with battery in a detention facility. again, I don't have any law to pass out right now to prove that up, but I'll put it into my proposed brief.

Circling back, as I stated before and I won't belabor the point, but under the rules of

construction, if there is no ambiguous -- ambiguity in the statute, construction of the statute, interpretation of the statute stops right there.

It's done. There's no need for you to go any further.

That's all I have. I'll answer questions if anyone has any.

MR. STRAUSS: You're saying that in the one highlighted 185.02, when you say the Board is going to violate 185, you're mostly talking about Subsection 16, police officer, which we have that same definition in our plan under 33.126?

MR. DARAGJATI: Yes, sir. I would submit -- I would argue to the Board that if you departed from -- if you construed 185.02, Subsection 16 to include time as a correctional officer without being certified as a police officer, it would run contrary to not only the spirit of the statute, but the actual language of the statute.

MR. STRAUSS: And then that same definition is in our ordinance because we copied it?

MR. DARAGJATI: Yes, sir.

MR. MARANO: Paul, do we know what the legislative intent was for the clarification in 1986, or is that even possibly getting out --

MR. DARAGJATI: I -- I looked hard trying to find some -- same analysis or anything, but I couldn't find anything.

MR. MARANO: Did anybody ever try and get an opinion from the division on what we're trying to do here, what's before us?

MR. DARAGJATI: I'm not familiar with one. The only opinion that I found even close to anything like this was actually an attorney general opinion. And this came up a few years ago when a lot of the departments were moving towards granting more and more job duties to the - they're called different things in different places - community service officers basically, the guys that are unsworn officers that handle traffic crashes and stuff. I'm not sure if you guys have them here in Hollywood.

But there were certain departments that were pushing more and more duties to them. And the Commissioner of FDLE asked for an opinion by the AG as to whether or not -- at what point do they have to be certified. And the AG rendered an opinion that you don't go by what their title is, you go by what their job duties are. And if their job duties fall under the definition of a police officer in 943, then they have to be certified. And I say that because

even in that realm, you can't conduct the work without being certified. It's vitally important.

MR. MARANO: And are there cases where boards have -- I don't want to say deviated, but interpreted on their own, say something of this nature and the division took exception to it?

MR. DARAGJATI: I think probably your Counsel would be better to answer that than I would. I know when I did pension work exclusively, there were cases where boards have denied correctional officer time when those guys -- it wasn't the same factual scenarios as we have here, those were times when they were working in actual full (inaudible) correctional facilities for the state, and they denied that time. They've approved time and buying police time when they were actually working in different parts of the country.

I'm familiar with one case where they ruled time as a police officer in another country, in Jamaica. But you can kind of line up that the job description that they had fit the job description under 943. And here, I just don't think it fits.

MR. MARANO: Okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: I mean, it's a little bit different in those cases where it was denied because

in those instances they were working for a correctional facility other than the same municipality. Here we're dealing with a case where corrections time is actually under the municipality of the City of Hollywood.

You could certainly -- you could task me with seeing if --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry.

MR. KAUFMAN: -- division had an opinion on it, I don't know whether they would or not. If it's found that you have violated 185 by allowing them service, you could take the position that they were going to withhold their premiums and lose all your money, (inaudible) but that's way far off in the future.

MR. MARANO: The situations in the past where we haven't complied or the City didn't comply, I mean it was years that it was held. I mean we just went through that.

MR. KAUFMAN: I think they withheld our chapter monies for years, the City was contributing with that supplement, yeah.

MR. STRAUSS: Paul, do you know -- so I know there's what Sergio Lopez is in it, but would this go for people that aren't part of this group? And would this -- second part of my question was, does this

also go to people that were just detention officers and never became police officers that have the GE pension that currently aren't with these people - if they would all come to the Board in the future? So both of those things.

MR. DARAGJATI: I would submit to the Board that whatever decision this Board makes on this group would be res judicata towards -- would be already decided for anyone else similarly situated to these guys.

I don't know if these six are the only ones in this universe, there could be more, I don't know the answer to that. But if there are, whatever the Board decides here applies to those guys as well.

MR. STRAUSS: Any other questions for them?

MR. KAUFMAN: I have nothing further.

Perhaps you could turn the floor back to Mr. Dutko for rebuttal arguments from them.

MR. DUTKO: Sure. And I'll be brief. I don't want to take up more time than is necessary.

Counsel talked about the difference between definitions in Florida Chapter 185, Florida Statute Chapter 185, between a correctional officer and a police officer. We don't deny that. I don't deny that there's a difference. I don't deny that a

correctional officer as that word is defined in the Florida Statutes is different than a police officer.

Our point is that the applicants here are not and were not ever correctional officers as that word is defined by Chapter 185. They don't fit the definition. Therefore, they were not correctional officers. They more rightfully fit the definition of police officer or law enforcement officer.

So I'm not asking you to willfully violate
Chapter 185. What I'm saying is our request is
consistent with 185. I should point out that at no
point in their job descriptions or in their job
titles were the applicants given any title of
correctional officer. It's semantics, I know, but
words are important, they were corrections officers
or detentions officers. They were never a
correctional officer as that word is used and defined
if Florida statutes.

Regarding the legislative intent - I know there was a question about the change back in 1986 - I'm not -- we're happy to look into that, too if there's any additional legislature intent that we're able to identify, we're happy to submit to you.

And I'd just say regarding your last question regarding the application of your decision here on

others who may come in. The important part about what Mr. Daragjati said was "similarly situated individuals", right. In order for there to even arguably be some sort of res judicata effect based on this decision, you're going to need folks that have the same sort of factual background as the applicants here. And in that instance they should be qualified as police officers, they should be categorized as police officers.

So don't take that as, you know, any decision you make automatically applies to all these other folks who served in these different roles. And the cases that were cited to the extent they have any applicability whatsoever, clearly show that, you know, the City is able to come up with different roles or different functions or different classifications.

What was the second case? The Rumpf case, the City of Miami versus Rumpf case, that dealt with differences in pay and there could be differences in pay based on different classifications. Of course that's true. We're not saying that, you know, folks who were previously considered corrections officers should have been paid the same as somebody who had a different technical job title in the City of

Hollywood.

The issue is very simply that under the definitions of Florida State statutes and what the City of Hollywood Board of Commissioners has decided applies through its Code, my clients were police officers and they should be credited as such for pension purposes.

MR. STRAUSS: For the 185.02, which Jeff just asked, are you going to follow up? I don't know if we could have an answer by May 28th?

MR. KAUFMAN: I'm sure we can.

Is that it, Mr. Dutko?

MR. DUTKO: Yes.

MR. KAUFMAN: Very good. So I suggest as follows, that the parties submit proposed orders by May 14th, which is a Friday. Next meeting, I believe, is going to be May 21st. So we could deliberate and make a final decision at the May 21st meeting with you having the benefit of having the written argument of both parties in hand a week before the meeting.

Read it, think about what your decision is going to be. Think about reasons why that's an important decision you are going to make because it's always helpful, should this be an appealed, that the Court

knows where the trustees are coming from in making their decision.

I'll tell you that we're guided by the burden of proof in this case would be a preponderance of the evidence. So you have to find that Mr. Dutko proved entitlement to his claim and more than 50 percent of the evidence weighs in his favor. Other than that, unless there are any other questions for myself or both Counsel, I would like to commend Counsel for the argument they made this afternoon. It was very well presented on behalf of their client and behalf of the Board.

Thank you for the time and effort. I know the trustees appreciate that. And thank you to the trustees for taking the time to hear this today. These are some of the most difficult decisions that you have to make whenever you have an administrative hearing be it a disability of a claim for benefits or a forfeiture, because you're deciding whether a fellow officer is entitled to something from the pension fund.

So it's always difficult. But I think that after you read the proposed orders, you'll have a better understanding of how the law has progressed over the years and be able to come to a conclusion at

1	the	board	meeting	on	May	21st

MR. MARANO: When and if the time comes, will we deliberate like in the shade session?

MR. KAUFMAN: You have to deliberate in the Sunshine, so it will all be out in the open. The only time it can go into executive session is if there is a lawsuit pending and you want to discuss strategy or settlements.

MR. DARAGJATI: Question. As far as the format of the proposed order, any specific requests regarding format, font, size, anything of that nature?

MR. KAUFMAN: It's up to you. I'm liberal. I don't have any -- doesn't matter as to page limitations or font size or anything. I just think it should be a proposed letter with statement of the facts and then conclusions of law.

MR. STRAUSS: Anybody have anything else?
Meeting adjourned.

MR. KAUFMAN: Very good. That will conclude the hearing this afternoon.

(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded at 2:10 p.m.)

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4	STATE OF FLORIDA)					
5	COUNTY OF BROWARD)					
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8	I, TERRI L. WRIGHT, Notary Public in and for the					
9	State of Florida at Large, certify that I was authorized					
10	to and did transcribe the foregoing proceedings and that					
11	the transcript is a true and complete record of my					
12	stenographic notes.					
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14	Dated this 21st day of May, 2021.					
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